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Migration as Hope
Space, Time, and Imagining the Future
by Frances Pine
In this paper, I look at different contexts of economic migration in the Polish highlands in the cities of Ło´dz´ and
Lublin. I consider what social and economic factors make migration an investment and a belief in a better future
and what other factors may lead to rejection of the possibility of migration. The periods I am considering are the
years of crisis during the late socialist era, the period of structural adjustment following the end of socialism, and
the period following accession to the European Union. I focus on kinship and households and the way in which
formal and informal economic activities, networks of care and reciprocity, and the possibilities of migration are
negotiated within and among them during these very different economic periods. I argue that migration is both a
future-orientated and a backward-looking process and one that involves movement between different temporalities,
spaces, and regimes of value.
New inventions or creations are not about replacing the
old with the new, but adding to the old, producing new
articulations. (Stengers 2003:264)
Introduction: Old and New Pasts,
Ruptures, and Utopias
In the past few years we have witnessed an enormous and
widespread intensification of levels of anxiety and uncertainty
and a sense of precariousness. The threat of economic collapse
is seen to be looming over almost all of the major and minor
world economies, and both local and global capitalism appear
to be caught in a crisis that shows little sign of abating.1 The
particulars and the locations of the crisis change from day to
day and week to week, but recovery remains a hope for the
future countered by predictions of impending breakdown and
chaos. To draw on Guyer’s (2007) nuanced perceptions of
past, present, and near and far future, we seem to have slipped
into a “time that is punctuated rather than enduring: of fateful
moments and turning points, the date as event rather than
as a position in a sequence or a cycle, dates as qualitatively
different rather than quantitatively cumulative” (Guyer 2007:
410). In retrospect, despite the enormous threat of nuclear
annihilation that cast a shadow over the cold war years, the
postwar Fordist period seems to represent a time of economic
calm and certainty.
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But other pasts are also being reviewed and at times re-
interpreted. It is relevant, I think, that the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the socialist states of Eastern Europe was
initially seen, at least in Western Europe and North America,
as a triumph of capitalism, free-market economy, and de-
mocracy over the tyranny and the inefficiency of a centralized
command economy, where surveillance society was domi-
nated by a corrupt and oppressive one-party state. What was
overlooked in this triumphalism was that socialism is as much
a utopian ideology as a modernist one and one underpinned
by a strong element of hope—the state will eventually wither
away, leaving an egalitarian order where people are free to be
both poets and builders. Or, in the vision of Emma Goldman,
and of the striking Polish textile workers in Massachusetts in
1912, socialism should bring both bread and roses.
The Western triumphalism that erupted in 1989 was rather
short lived. A series of economic and political crises erupted
that were to mark the following decade of global capitalism—
giving birth to the current age of uncertainty, which bears
little resemblance to the prosperous future that many had
anticipated. If capitalism as a source of growth and hope for
the future is no longer credible, are there any memories of
socialism, utopian or otherwise, that leave us something on
which to build?
This article is concerned with the concepts of hope, value,
1. I think it is important to recognize here, however, that the financial
collapse of 2008 was a crisis generated by and experienced most strongly
in Western Europe and North America. In many other parts of the world,
what was considered a sudden crisis in these Western countries was closer
to the ongoing, normal condition of life. Nonetheless, the economic
collapse that followed 2008 had and continues to have repercussions in
terms of employment, work opportunities, economic migration, etc.,
throughout the entire world economy.
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and future in different political and economic contexts, times,
and places. I focus particularly on migration, which I argue
can be both a symbol and an enactment of hope and of faith
in the future and an act of or a reaction to hopelessness,
despair, and acute loss in the present.
Hope
Hope is a complex, many-layered notion resting on the ca-
pacity for imagination, on a sense of time and of temporal
progress, on a desire to believe in a better future or in the
possibility that something can change, and to some extent on
uncertainty. Hope is also always mirrored or shadowed by its
opposite, despair. We hope for a particular future, but we do
not know with certainty that it will take place or take place
in the way we desire. We fear that the outcome of this un-
certainty may be despair or what will happen if hope dimin-
ishes and fades away.
Ernest Bloch, in his wonderful work The Principle of Hope
(1986), evokes a range of images of foreign lands, travel to
exotic places, hidden treasures, and day dreams—day dreams
are the things that are a bringing into, but not yet an achieved,
consciousness. The past contains the lessons we live by—the
aspects of life that we want to maintain or to bring back if
they have been lost and those that we want to eliminate and
reject. The future is imagined through reference to both
“good” and “bad” pasts (see also Pine 1998, 2002) and to
utopian dreams of what might be.
The postindustrial, post-Fordist era of globalization and
fragmentation marks the beginning of a new or much inten-
sified flexibility in the organization and valorization of labor
vividly described by Harvey (1992) as the “condition of post-
modernity.” More recently, Harvey (2000) has revisited the
ideas of hope and utopia. Struck by the lack of expressions
or discourses of hope at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, he proposes a rethinking of political and economic
practices, both spatial and temporal, that could generate new
ways of being in the world, confronting both the inequalities
inherent in advanced capitalism and globalization on the one
hand and the degradation of global ecology on the other.
Harvey suggests a radical rereading of Marx; his proposals for
a new order, presented as a futurist vision in his final ap-
pendix, show us what he imagines a utopian world might
look like but does not quite show how we might get there.2
How can we unravel the entangled processes of global flows
of capital, labor, technologies and materials, migration, and
uneven development in order to facilitate the possibility of a
more equitable and less degraded and degrading world? One
possible route might entail a revalorization of human labor
and production linked to a more responsible approach to
consumption and a rebuilding of increasingly fragmented la-
2. In Harvey’s imagined utopia, as in other recent discussions of hope
(e.g., Zournazi 2002), the emphasis on femalecentric or feminist-inspired
social forms is striking.
bor and productive processes. Another might involve new
systems of care around generations, neighborhoods, and kin
or friendship networks in response to the decline of the wel-
fare state.
Another question altogether is whether the economic, po-
litical, and military structures of global power are so deeply
entrenched that only a major disaster or war could now gen-
erate major change. These are hypothetical questions, but they
directly address the problems and concerns that people ev-
erywhere encounter today, and they try to resolve or at least
come to some kind of uneasy terms with their daily lived-in
worlds.
One thing I want to consider here is whether, and if so
how, people are able to draw on aspects of the past in creating
imagined futures. I think this is particularly pertinent in re-
lation to the former socialist countries for reasons I will de-
velop below. Isabelle Stengers (2003:244–272) calls for a new
optimism, a focus not on limitations of thoughts and pos-
sibilities and what cannot be done but rather on what we
might be able to accomplish if we open our minds: “Crushing
capitalism or destroying capitalism or whatever is a dream,
but as such it is not a very interesting dream, because nobody
on earth is able to imagine what we would do if that suddenly
happened. We live in a very complicated world; we have to
learn and become able to dream other dreams” (Stengers
2003:256). Stengers’s musings remind us that the (social)
world is neither magical nor natural; we make it, and we can
strive and fight to make it in different ways (see also Gibson-
Graham 2006).
Postsocialist Realism
Anthropologists working on and in the postsocialist countries
offered strong and convincing critiques of the “transition”
model of restructuring and development drawing on eth-
nographic detail and emphasizing historical perspective. Ac-
counts of closing factories and deindustrialization, the col-
lapse of collective farms and the impoverishment of state farm
workers, the loss of social entitlements ranging from jobs and
housing to health and child care, the growth of new mafias
and sex work and the drug trade, violence against Roma, war,
and forced migration dominated the anthropological work of
the 1990s situated in the postsocialist region. Threading
through much of this research was a theme of loss of op-
portunity and abandonment of hope for entire populations
of workers and citizens who had under socialism lived in a
relatively calm, secure, and settled world where the future had
been, or had seemed to be, certain. Recurring themes of ex-
treme loss haunt this literature, and it was often difficult for
either the people themselves or the anthropologists taking
account to see how anything could be redeemed after such
extraordinary change.
Some ethnographic accounts, however, focused on gener-
ations and change and the hopes, dreams, and fears that peo-
ple entertained for their children. The most desperate ac-
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counts were those involving abandonment of children—work
from Siberia, for instance (Vitebsky 2002), documented par-
ents voluntarily giving up their children because they had no
hope of providing them with a future. Other stories were
more optimistic; encountering the loss of their own worlds,
parents still imagined a better future for their children (Pilk-
ington 1997; Pine 2002).
Studies at this time also documented the extraordinary
growth of national and transnational migration. Much of the
research focused on those who had been school children in
the late socialist period and had come of age in the 1990s.
Here, ethnographic focus had shifted to the next generation,
many of whom did not look back with longing and nostalgia
to the past but rather forward to a new and different world
characterized by mobility and movement across spaces and
temporalities very different from those of their parents and
grandparents.
In Eastern Europe, after the fall of socialism, borders,
nations, states, and localities all were destabilized. After de-
cades of highly controlled movement, people began to make
spatial shifts. Some movement and migration took place in
the turmoil or aftermath of war, some in the face of unem-
ployment and deindustrialization, and some in direct response
to ethnic or racial exclusion or violence; increasing numbers
of people were also choosing to go abroad temporarily for
work or study.
With European Union (EU) accession, eastern borders
hardened, resulting in a growth of illegal border traffic (Follis
2012) while softening border regimes to the west facilitated
legal migration. Migrations are often circular, or repeated,
and involve long-term comings and goings (Grill 2011). Many
of the highly mobile young women and men have little or
no personal memory of socialism; what they have is a post-
memory received through their parents’ and grandparents’
accounts.
Periods of Change and Rupture
What I want to suggest here is that looking at ethnographies
of both socialism and postsocialism can help us to understand
how ideas of value, hope, and future develop and sometimes
transform at times of social and political turmoil, economic
restructuring, and general fragility. This is particularly clear
if we look both at diverse regions—rural and urban, incor-
porated and marginal or excluded—and at different historical
moments. What this multilayered perspective shows is that
local cultures of value, of valorization of persons and work,
are variable even within what appears from the outside to be
one relatively homogeneous political economy. Further, it al-
lows us to see how different concepts of work, of value, and
of the place of the individual in a wider social or political
collective allow or even generate different imaginings of pos-
sibilities and of hopes and desires or conversely of loss and
despair in relation to the past, the present, and the future.
Socialism is an interesting backdrop for this discussion be-
cause it had such a strongly utopian imaginary and was based
on such a powerful and encompassing futurist ideology
(Buck-Morss 2002). But in real time, in the lived world, it
was a system characterized by contradiction, providing social
and economic certainty and security on the one hand and
lurching precariously from one political and economic crisis
to the next on the other. The result was often bipolar—a
world that people occupied with both commitment (see, e.g.,
Hann 1980; Humphrey 1983; Swain 1985) and cynicism (see,
e.g., Ledeneva 1998; Yurchak 1997) simultaneously.
Further, within the socialist states, there were some workers
deeply committed to building the socialist future—for ex-
ample, miners, steelworkers, and those in other heavy in-
dustries (Kideckel 2008)—and some members of the intel-
ligentsia who at least for some years tried to create a new
society (Bauman 1988). There were also others, often marginal
people such as Roma (Stewart 1997) or Go´rale (Pine 1999),
who actively engaged in imagining and sometimes pursuing
alternative strategies outside the strictures of state socialism.
Finally, historical events, policies, and the often harsh hand
of the state combined to create an environment into which
precariousness could suddenly and unexpectedly be inter-
jected. People who had imagined a socialist future in the late
1940s and who had believed themselves to be building it may
well have become deeply disillusioned and alarmed by the
mid-1950s. Out of that disillusionment could come counter
discourse and movements for change, such as the Prague
Spring, or the Solidarity movement. Despite the presence of
highly militarized and intrusive states, at particular critical
moments ordinary people felt able and morally entitled to
challenge those states and felt enough hope to imagine and
offer up visions of alternative futures.
Contradictory Socialist Worlds
These different kinds of trajectory are illustrated beautifully
in Andrzej Wajda’s film Man of Marble (Człowiek z mar-
muru). Made in the late 1970s at the height of the economy
of shortage that marked the Gierek years in Poland, it tells
the story of Agnieszka, a young film student, clad in American
denim and chain smoking Marlboros,3 who decides to make
her diploma film on Mateusz Birkut, a Stakhanovite hero.
Her research takes her back to the end of the war and the
time of almost innocent hope when thousands of citizens
made their way to Warsaw, the capital city almost totally
destroyed by the retreating Germans, to rebuild it. The en-
thusiasm and the naivety of this generation of workers are
all the more striking because we know that in the previous
six or seven years they had witnessed the worst possible kinds
of violence and destruction. But somehow they maintained
a sense of hope and a belief in their ability to build a future.
3. American denim and Marlboro cigarettes were among the most
important, if not the two most important, signifiers of status, street chic,
and either money or contacts (ideally Western) during the 1970s.
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The young Stakhanovite marries a beautiful young gymnast
and sets national records for brick making in the construction
of the gigantic modernist steel works, Nowa Huta, outside
the all too bourgeois city of Krakow. The beautiful young
couple gets the dream apartment, the flowers and medals and
accolades, and up until this point they retain their innocence
and their ability to dream. But then of course it all goes
horribly wrong. Birkut has set standards so high that his fellow
workers resent him, and sabotage him, causing terrible burns
to his hands (the embodiment of the value of his labor), and
then the heavy hand of late Stalinism, fueled by envy and
dangerous rumors and generating arrests on fabricated
charges, descends on everyone, with disastrous results. Birkut
is discredited and spends time in prison; Hanka, his champion
gymnast wife, moves on to live with a corrupt party official
and subdues her painful memories with vodka, and things
fall apart. The beautiful couple is in effect erased from history.
However, Agnieszka eventually tracks down the story of
the worker hero. Birkut ended up working in the Lenin Ship-
yards in Gdan´sk and was killed in 1970 when government
troops fired on protesting workers in the shipyard. His son
has meanwhile become a worker in the Lenin Shipyards. The
film moves from bleak loss and despair to a final scene of
hope manifested in the meeting of the two members of the
younger generation, the Stakhanovite’s son and the young
filmmaker who has, during the course of the film, remem-
bered her own working-class origins.4
Man of Marble was released in Poland in the late 1970s. I
saw it in the cinema in Nowa Huta itself. We were the only
people in the audience, I think, who were not steelworkers
or members of steelworker families. The atmosphere was elec-
tric, and I understood viscerally for the first time that things
could not continue as they were in Gierek’s Poland and that
something enormous was going to happen very soon. This
was a year or so before the occupation of the Lenin Shipyards
and the birth of the independent trade union Solidarity.
During this period, I also heard Leszek Kołakowski give a
talk at the London School of Economics. He argued that it
was not appropriate to speak of socialist ideology, because
ideology had to be believed, and at least in Poland, nobody,
not even the highest officials of the party, believed it. Yurchak
(1997) later took a similar position in his account of the
cynicism of everyday life in Russia. I think this argument is
slightly problematic, because people were both cynical about
the socialist regime and believed that some aspects of the
socialist world were good and inherently moral. It was this
4. Birkut’s death is actually explicitly revealed in a second film, Man
of Iron, which tells the story of his son, still working in the Lenin Shipyards
and marrying the (very pregnant) Agnieszka under the benign eye of
Lech Wałe˛sa. While Man of Marble is a strong political and historical
critique of the past and a foreshadowing of political activism in the (then)
immediate future, Man of Iron is a utopian imagining of the future, from
the perspective of the present, of the possibility of a populist hope emerg-
ing from decades of loss and despair.
bipolarity that made the system so precarious but also gave
it the flexibility to survive as long as it did.
Although most people were highly skeptical about state
socialism and about the motives and behavior of political
leaders and bureaucrats, many still believed unquestioningly
in, and took for granted, the stability and permanence of work
and employment, housing, and basic social services. And I
would argue that this uneasy coexistence of hope and cynicism
continued well into the first decade after socialism and per-
haps still continues in many quarters, allowing a response to
capitalist markets and free-market ideology that is simulta-
neously one of resigned pessimism and hopeful optimism.
While the former often results in a kind of economic and
social paralysis at both the individual and community levels,
the latter may allow the development of alternative strategies.
Migration: Pasts and Futures
I now turn to migration, one of the most common alternative
strategies in the postsocialist world and beyond since the col-
lapse of the socialist states and the simultaneous acceleration
of globalism and fragmented capitalism. I am particularly
interested in migration as a strategy that is future orientated
and embodies hope in the context of the socialist and post-
socialist states, because socialist ideology was so firmly linked
to nation building and modernity—to a future to be built
through labor in its proper place—in the socialist nation-
state. At the same time, both during and particularly after
socialism, working abroad appeared to be the best strategy
for earning money and accumulating goods in ways that could
substantially change the quality of life of the entire household
back home. So migration was often developed as a household
strategy, sending some household members away in hope of
ensuring the future of others. And this in turn often meant,
for the migrants, working in conditions and socioeconomic
contexts that were not only not highly valued but were in
fact undervalued, both in the host country and at home. In
a sense, migration takes the moral or social value out of work;
labor, rather than being valorized as it takes place, becomes
something to be endured in the short-term present for a
greater good in the long-term future. The near future “be-
comes reinhabited by forms of punctuated time,” while the
more distant future is a place of hope, dreams, or intimations
on some possible utopia (Guyer 2007:210). These are ideas I
want to examine now.
Ethnographies of Migration and Change
Particular ethnographic examples allow us to consider in
more detail the points I have raised above. I shall look first
at some of my own research in Poland, which spans the period
from the Gierek years in the late 1970s to the post–EU ac-
cession period at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
In my consideration of these cases, I want to explore migration
as a process that is both future orientated and (nearly always)
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backward looking. In other words, by its very nature it in-
volves the migrant in different temporalities of past, present,
and future and different spaces of home and elsewhere.
I should make it clear here that I am not making a straight-
forward comparison between these case studies, and I am not
trying to make parallel analyses. The situations I am consid-
ering are different in many ways. In my own work, I am
looking at three specific areas of Poland, in each case at a
distinct time. Each period of research spanned a particular
critical period in Polish recent history: the 1980s in the Pod-
hale, marked by the economy of shortage of late socialism,
martial law, and Solidarity; the early to mid-1990s in Ło´dz´,
framed by massive unemployment and fragmentation in the
wake of postsocialist restructuring; and the early 2000s in
Lublin, the period just before and following EU accession.
Rather than follow any one region through time, I want to
consider each in terms of one particular critical moment of
fragility and change and the strategies that local people de-
veloped in response.
Three Polish Settings
Of the three regions of Poland I am considering here, one—
the Podhale—is an area that has been politically and eco-
nomically marginal and excluded for much of its history.
Marked by movement and migration on quite a large scale
since at least the seventeenth century, migration from this
area reached mammoth proportions in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries during years of plague and fam-
ine and as massive segmentation of farms due to partible
inheritance took place. The area continued to be associated
with poverty until well into the socialist period, and even
then, despite strict state controls over movement, people from
this region continued to travel to Chicago as migrant workers
(Pine 1999). In both its marginality and the long-established
mobility of its population, it is very different historically from
the second region, Ło´dz´ and its surrounds.
The city of Ło´dz´ was the site of early industrialization,
particularly in textile production, in the nineteenth century,
which made it more a destination of local (rural-urban) mi-
gration than a source of extensive out-migration and secured
its central and incorporated position in the national political
economy. Known as “the city of working women” (miasto
kobiet pracowniczych), during the socialist period it had a
female working population fiercely committed to the socialist
state but also fully capable of chastising it when it failed to
uphold its part of the moral contract between workers and
management. The textile workers of Ło´dz´ comprised a highly
politicized, extremely militant work force and were active
players in the different periods of industrial unrest and social
protest that erupted nationally between the 1950s and 1980s.5
5. In fact, the textile workers’ reputation for militancy extended into
the postsocialist period, and it was said that when American companies
wanted to open textile factories in Poland in the 1990s, they rejected
Ło´dz´ as a site because of the workers’ politics.
This was an area where people stayed and worked in industry
and agriculture rather than moving away (Pine 1998).
The third field site, the city of Lublin and its surrounding
areas, situated on the edge of the Kresy, the borderlands be-
tween Poland and Ukraine, is different again. An early political
and religious center, it was the site of the capital of the short-
lived Polish Lithuanian Union in the mid-seventeenth century
and still is home to the famous Catholic University (which
remained open throughout socialism) and major automobile
and helicopter factories as well as extensive lighter industry.
Although Solidarity had a strong presence in the area, and in
fact in 1980 the strikes in the S´widnik auto factory preceded
those in the Lenin Shipyards, the region is better known for
being conservative and strongly Catholic, with a long history
of ethnic tensions and violence across borders as well as forced
movement and resettlements during the Second World War
and the early socialist period.6 Thus, these three regions have
different social, economic, and political histories and quite
varied histories of migration.
Case 1: The Effervescence of Migration: Podhale
I did my first fieldwork in Poland in the late 1970s,7 in a
small Go´rale village in the Podhale, the foothills of the High
Tatras. Gierek, a former miner, then headed the socialist state
in a rather flexible way, borrowing large sums of dollars and
then, in desperate need of hard currency to service his rapidly
growing foreign debt, allowing a softening of border regimes.
It became slightly easier for Poles to obtain passports and
apply for visitors’ visas to the United States or another West-
ern country and travel abroad. Most frequently, from the
Podhale at least, they went to America, where local authorities,
cognizant of local need for cheap unregistered labor, turned
a blind eye to their presence in factories and on construction
sites, while the Polish government, when they returned, wel-
comed their dollar earnings and turned a blind eye to their
source. In the late 1970s there was almost no house among
the 250 or so in the village without at least one member in
Chicago.
This pattern was not new. In fact, it far predated the socialist
period, beginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
when famine, plague, and land fragmentation sent Go´rale
abroad “for bread,” most lucratively to North America. It still
continues today, although there is now an increase in shorter
migrations, to destinations such as Italy and Greece, and
opening of new migratory paths, for instance to the United
Kingdom and Ireland. Chicago remains an important desti-
nation, but migration now tends to be permanent or until
6. In 1939 Lublin’s population was more than half Jewish. During the
war the city held the largest death camp, Majdanek, and there is now
very little visible trace of the city’s Jewish past.
7. My research in the Podhale was funded by the then Social Sciences
Research Council (SSRC) and the Economic and Social Research Council
(ESRC) between 1978 and 1991. The ESRC also funded my research in
Ło´dz´ (see below).
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the age of pension (a pension goes a lot farther in rural Poland
than in Chicago).
In terms of this discussion, the Podhale case is interesting
because movement and migration characterize economic or-
ganization from the seventeenth century, when Go´rale shep-
herds migrated from Wlachian regions along the Carpathian
Mountains with their herds, until today. So, unlike the other
cases I consider here, migration is not a practice emerging
from the collapse of the socialist economy or the opening up
of new economic markets in Europe. Rather it is one of a
bundle of strategies historically elaborated by households and
kin groups outside the context or beyond the reach of the
state. As I have discussed elsewhere (Pine 2008), villagers
derive their senses of identity, belonging, and personal value
from their land and their farming and craft labor. Waged labor
is consistently undervalued, although since the early socialist
period, nearly all villagers have been involved in it for at least
part of their working lives, and throughout the socialist period
it was actually the main source of regular income for most
houses. The valorization of migrant labor, however, is much
more complex than that of local waged labor.
The successful migrant brings home earnings far greater
than any local income. Because of its potential for generating
(relatively) enormous income, migration is highly desired,
sought after, and valued. It also exacts a high price, both from
the migrant her/himself and from their kindred. Often the
work abroad is hard and lacking in prestige. Often the living
conditions are bleak and difficult, and often employers are
harsh or dishonest. Young female migrants tend to work as
au pairs or housekeepers, and when they talk to their families
by phone or return to visit, they complain about being lonely
and homesick. Looking after other people’s children, they
miss months and sometimes years of their own children’s
lives. Similarly, caring for the elderly, ill, or infirm abroad
often means that they miss the last years of their own elderly
kin in the village. All of these factors generate real pain and
emotional hardship. However, migration continues to be cen-
tral to village life, and to a great extent kinship obligations
and household economies revolve around it. It is negotiated
within the immediate and extended family who will go abroad
and who will stay behind, who will look after the children or
the elderly parents, and on what the remittances will be spent.
In this sense it is a project of hope and is geared toward the
future, toward building a new house, investing in more land
or other property, providing dowries for daughters, and gen-
erally building the prestige and the future of the house. It is
always a risk, of course. Some people are unsuccessful and
return empty handed. Occasionally, a migrant breaks contact
with house and family and makes a separate new life abroad.
Sometimes children whose parents are working abroad run
wild, get into trouble, or are not cared for by their kin; some-
times elderly parents become ill, isolated, and neglected. But
despite these risks, wage migration remains the most valued
strategy in nearly all village houses.
One of the most interesting aspects of economic migration
is that it involves people in very different temporalities and
regimes of value simultaneously. As with transnational citi-
zenship more generally, migrants exist in, or sometimes be-
tween, two worlds. They work, in the present, in the host
economy. There their work is undervalued and underpaid,
and they are often the most exploited of workers, at the bot-
tom of all social and economic piles (see Kaneff and Pine
2011). This sparse existence, however, is hidden from the
present in the village. As family and village continue in their
absence, the migrant occupies a kind of future position or
vague point in the future—the point of their return, of receipt
of remittances, of future investments, and of reunification of
families. In this future position, the poorly paid earnings are
transformed into immense social and monetary value in the
village. In the migrant’s present, she or he often lives in terrible
housing, eats badly, buying only the cheapest food, and works
two or more jobs. But in the imagined future, back in the
village, they have created from this suffering a new affluence
for themselves and their dependents.
I would argue that this kind of endemic migration—mi-
gration as a way of life, as a major strand in house and kin
strategies—that has deep historical roots, is different from
what we might think of as crisis migration—migration that
takes place as a response to war, economic collapse, or other
trauma.
Case 2: Ło´dz´: Working Women Out of Work
In Ło´dz´ and its surrounding areas, where I studied the collapse
of the largely female textile industry after 1989, it was striking
that migration was seen as an act of hopelessness and of
abandonment of the future. Textile workers were grounded
firmly in their work, and as I have argued elsewhere, it was
a major source of their identity and value (Pine 2002). In the
early 1990s, in the middle of the most brutal period of eco-
nomic restructuring, I talked to women about the possibility
of moving elsewhere, either within Poland or abroad, to find
work after the factories closed in Ło´dz´. Their reaction was
uniformly one of horror. Their imagined future lay not in
new worlds or opportunities but in restitution of the lost
order. They wanted their own work back, they wanted so-
cialism back, and they wanted to be valorized for their skilled
labor. They could not imagine leaving their tight networks of
kin and friends. By the mid to late 90s, however, some of the
women were considering moving within Poland, although no
one I spoke to contemplated going abroad. But on the whole,
the focus of their imagined futures and their hope was the
next generation. As one woman phrased it, at the end of a
long, tearful interview in the mid-1990s, “Of course I still
have dreams. We have to have dreams, don’t we? Or we have
nothing. But our dreams are for the children now. We have
to keep going (living) for the children” (see also Pilkington
1997; Pine 1998).
In this region, belief in the socialist present had been strong,
if critical, and it was hard for people to leave that certainty
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behind, even when it became ruptured and uncertain. It is
the next generation, the children of whom this woman spoke,
who became the migrants. The ethnographic documentary
Our Street (Nasza ulica) made a few years ago followed the
lives of a family living near one of the biggest nineteenth-
century textile factories in Ło´dz´. It was a factory that had
employed many of the women I interviewed in the 1990s.
During that period of restructuring, under the Balcerowicz
Plan, there had been major redundancies. The factory had
then been sold into German ownership and finally closed
down. A decade later, when the film was being made, it was
being turned into an enormous shopping arcade called, I
suspect without irony, Manufaktura. The film follows the
members of this particular family while the arcade project is
being developed. The flat where they live is down the street
from the factory/shopping mall. Living in the flat at the be-
ginning of the film are a widow, who had been a textile worker
in the factory, her middle-aged son, who had also worked
there, his daughter, who was unemployed and pregnant, and
her boyfriend. Over the next 3 years, the old woman is the
main support, emotionally and financially, of the whole fam-
ily. She works as a cleaner. Her son drinks a great deal and
from time to time tries to get work as a guard or construction
worker on the developing Manufaktura site. He is never suc-
cessful. The daughter has her baby, and her boyfriend becomes
involved in petty crime and goes to prison. At the end of the
film, the (great)grandmother is raising the baby, the men are
unemployed, the younger still in prison, and the granddaugh-
ter has migrated to Germany. My impression is that this is
not an unusual story for former textile families. The older
woman, like so many of her generation to whom I spoke
more than a decade previously, never worked in her own field
again and felt that she had lost her place and her value. She
also felt she had to remain where she was, to hold the family
together, which she did. It was the young woman who was
able to imagine new beginnings and to make plans for a future
that could provide a way out of poverty, unemployment, and
petty crime. Unlike Go´rale migration, however, this seemed
to be less of an investment by several generations into the
growth of the family/house than a bid for personal, individual
freedom, probably at the cost of losing her child. The grand-
mother, of the generation who felt they had been thrown
away and had no future except through the children, contin-
ued to hold the present together, but with few prospects in
her own future.
Sites of Change: EU Accession, Migration, and New Futures
After EU accession, the situation regarding economic migra-
tion changed considerably for new member states. Although
only the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Ireland granted cit-
izens of the countries from the first (2004) expansion full
rights to work and reside, they had limited rights throughout
the entire union. Interestingly, not all migrants welcomed this
new legal status. Go´rale villagers I spoke to at that time who
were working in Italy, for instance, had no intention of be-
coming “legal” or getting proper papers, as they felt it would
allow the state to gain too much information about them,
and of course it would subject them to income loss through
taxes.
Again, I think this refusal reflects migrants’ simultaneous
occupation of two or even three different regimes of value:
their local one, where they expect to be visible, known, and
recognized and to carry out their financial obligations to kin
and community; that of the Polish state, where they have to
be visible as citizens in some contexts, such as education or
taxation, but may try to limit the financial implications of
this involvement, and where they want to be visible and fi-
nancially supported in others, such as pensions or health care;
and that of their migration place, where they exchange their
unvalorized present labor for economic value in the future
and try very hard to stay invisible in the meantime.
Case 3: Lublin and EU Accession
For other categories of Poles who have perhaps less compli-
cated relations with the state, however, the laws of EU ex-
pansion provided a new vision of hope and new possibilities
in imagining the future. In the period leading up to and
following accession, I conducted research in Lublin and the
eastern borderlands on EU membership and new patterns of
exclusion. In research sites ranging from NGOs aimed at fa-
cilitating participation in EU projects and funding for agri-
culture and small businesses to unemployment offices and
claimant groups to charities for the homeless, we looked at
the strategies that people were developing and pursuing in
response to the changing political economy.8 It was clear from
interviews and life stories that in this region, after a long
history of migration and displacement, often forced and usu-
ally political rather than economic, the socialist period had
on the whole been a time of little movement. Most older
people to whom we spoke had kin in other parts of Poland
or Europe, but on the whole these moves had been made
before or during the war years. It was only among the age
set from late teens to late twenties that nearly everyone, male
and female, employed and unemployed, rural and urban, had
close friends or relatives working abroad, mostly in the United
Kingdom or Germany, and they intended to go abroad them-
selves. For nearly all of them, migration represented a tem-
porary interruption in their Lublin lives and a tool to enable
them to make better lives for themselves and their families.
Some planned to earn as much money as possible, as quickly
as possible, and return to Lublin to set up a small business.
Some concentrated more on training, hoping to study at uni-
versity, to learn computer skills, to improve their languages.
Most arranged their migration through networks of friends,
8. This research was funded by the Volkswagen Foundation and sup-
ported by the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology. I worked
closely with two research assistants, Ania Witeska and Kinga Sekerdej,
and the findings are as much their work as mine.
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not through kin (which is the normal form of Go´rale mi-
gration). Several young people we interviewed had already
been abroad and had made connections to temporary jobs—
as waitresses, nannies, construction workers, agriculture la-
borers, and factory workers. Some had already made several
short trips, while others intended to return at intervals. De-
pending on the kind of work they were doing, some felt visible
and valued and not much worse paid than local workers,
while others, particularly those working in agriculture, meat
packing, or informal care, felt vulnerable, exploited, and un-
derpaid.
Those who felt that they had been or were successful mi-
grants clearly saw themselves as participating equally in two
different labor markets, in each for different reasons. At the
time, this region of eastern Poland was officially the poorest
and most economically “backward” area in the entire EU, and
unemployment, by both formal and informal estimation, was
very high. So here again, migration became an act of faith
and hope in the future, reflecting a belief that by going away
and participating in a different economy, it was possible to
put on hold present difficulties and, ideally, overcome them
on return.
Where this migration is different from the Go´rale pattern
is in relation to kinship obligations and exchanges. It is very
common in this area for parents or grandparents to pay for
travel or for English lessons or IT training. I was told by
several grandparents that in the past they would have helped
to pay for a flat, house materials, or a wedding; a plane ticket
to the United Kingdom or English language lessons are the
contemporary equivalents. The young people were not ex-
pected to send back remittances to the senior generations, at
least not those in the city.9 Nor were the senior generations
expected to look after small children in the parents’ absence;
this is rather a very modern kind of migration, often repeated,
by young people who are attempting to build new and very
different lives from those of their parents and grandparents.
While they bring back individual presents, they only rarely
hand over their earnings either as regular remittances or when
returning. Rather, the elder generations are consciously help-
ing them to build these new, different, and often far more
individualistic futures. There may well be an expectation of
care in old age, of course, but in the present what is empha-
sized is the hope that the children will be able to build some-
thing new. And what is seen as new, and valued, is not the
manual labor in industry and agriculture from which many
of the senior generation drew their value and sense of identity
9. I suspect that this may be more common in the countryside, al-
though I did not encounter it personally, and it is clearly nothing like
as widespread as this practice in the Podhale. What is more common is
for one parent, either the father or the mother depending on who has
more marketable skills or who has a job in Lublin, to go and leave the
other parent working and caring for the house and children. But this is
a practice of the elder age group—those in their 30s or 40s. Unlike Go´rale
practice, it is usually a project involving primarily the nuclear family, not
more extended kindred.
but nonmaterial labor in IT, language, and other nonmanual
skills.
Critical Moments and Migration
These three periods I have been discussing were all times of
marked economic and social uncertainty, and each generated
adaptive strategies to some extent at least peculiar to the
specific time and region. However, an overall pattern emerges
in which the work done by the migrant abroad involves being
temporarily part of a quite different value regime from the
one at home, but it is undertaken in order to maintain the
one at home or to improve or change it. So, for instance,
young people from the Lubelskie countryside may do agri-
cultural labor in the United Kingdom, filling a gap created
by the refusal of British workers to perform agricultural labor
for low wages. This allows the Poles to fund leaving agriculture
and setting up in a quite different kind of work when they
get home. In all of these cases, present hardship is countered
by future hopes, and strategies are developed that play on
and take advantage of the distances and differences between
the home and destination political economies and markets.
I began this paper by talking about socialism as both an
often repressive modernist movement and an often failing
utopian one, but I argued that in both cases human value
and social personhood to a great extent were made through
labor. I suggested that the losses experienced with the fall of
socialism were most clearly manifested in the dismantling of
labor—both labor practices and markets and the physical
places where labor could be carried out. Go´rale, who operated
both within the state as wage laborers and outside it as mi-
grants and informal entrepreneurs, saw little difference in
their value regimes with the fall of socialism. In the other
regions I discussed, generations were thrown away, and new
attempts were made to change the future by entering tem-
porarily into other economies.
Olena Fedyuk (2011) has demonstrated brilliantly how
much migration is a future-orientated process that in the
present extracts enormous personal cost—leaving one’s own
old and frail parents in order to look after someone else’s,
leaving children and grandchildren in order to care for those
of others—that can only be vindicated if it generates profit
and reward and growth. In this discourse, the Ukrainian mi-
grant woman is making present sacrifices for the future good.
Fedyuk shows that is often middle-aged women, profes-
sional by training but unemployed in Ukraine’s frail economy,
who go abroad to find work so that their adult daughters can
stay at home and look after their children. The mothers send
remittances home, which allow the daughters not to work.
However, these same migrant mothers often take their young
adult or adolescent sons abroad with them because they be-
lieve that if these sons were to stay at home, they would be
in danger from violence and alcohol abuse fueled by a climate
of endemic unemployment.
So, in a sense, it could be argued that through the work
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of their bodies—and care work must be one of the most
intimate and embodied forms of paid labor possible—and
through the act of migration, these women are attempting to
create new “spaces of hope,” through new transnational bod-
ies, for the next generation.
Reflections
Can these ethnographies of loss and change, migration and
adaptation, help us to understand how new economic prac-
tices may emerge from both the demise of socialism and the
ongoing crises in global capitalism? In many ways, it is the
kin and friendship networks on which people relied during
socialism in order to deal with the economies of shortage that
provide a kind of template for entering into the new mobile
economic processes around migration. The assumptions that
value arises from labor and that frail and dependent people
are entitled to care, just as everyone is entitled to work, un-
derpin the new ways that many postsocialist actors articulate
with the new economy. However, in the case of migration, it
is the absence of the state in provision and regulation of labor,
work, and care entitlements that creates both the driving and
receiving forces around migration. The British agricultural
economy relies increasingly on cheap foreign labor; the Italian
family system relies on foreign care workers; the Polish and
Ukrainian economies need these foreign markets to fill the
gaps in care and provision left by the retraction of the socialist
state. In many ways, acts of migration do represent spaces of
hope; they also represent new “articulations” of old structures:
as care needs at home must be met, as young people migrating
abroad do so increasingly as individuals seeking to build new
lives, new economic opportunities are sought rather than at-
tempting to save those already lost. It seems that where mi-
gration and other economic activity beneath the radar of the
state have been long established, as with the Go´rale, it con-
tinues with relative ease. Where, however, there is enormous
rupture between the material and moral economy of socialism
and the new individualism of global capitalism, the gains and
losses are less clearly balanced. The young Polish girl who
goes to London on a ticket paid for by her grandmother and
returns to start her own business is one model of increased
individualism; the middle-aged Ukrainian economist who
leaves her own aging parents to care for someone else’s in
Italy is rather different. And yet each is coping with the de-
mands and vagaries of the international labor order.
Chantal Mouffe, like Harvey, has commented on the cur-
rent lack of hope:
The problem today is not so much around the question of
class but around a critique of the capitalist system. And I
think that is where the analysis has to be done. One of the
reasons why I think there is no hope today for future pos-
sibility is precisely because people feel there is no alternative
to the capitalist system, and even more to the neoliberal
form of capitalism which is dominant today. (quoted in
Zournazi 2002:135)
Zournazi (2002) suggests a more anthropological perspective,
calling for “a hope that does not narrow our visions of the
world but instead allows different histories, memories and
experiences to enter into present conversations on revolution,
freedom and our cultural senses of belonging” (18). I have
tried to show the way the problems of capitalism, combined
with the failure of state socialism, create conditions of pre-
cariousness through which people must then try to navigate
their way in daily practice. Ideas about hope, freedom, and
the future are not absent from most lives, even those that are
highly disrupted, but rather can be seen to be deeply rooted
in household, kin, and individual strategies such as those that
develop around migration as people move between different
economic regimes and registers and different temporalities.
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